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Abstract 
 
Based on empirical data, this study discusses the introduction, acceptance and circulation of two 
complementary currencies in Argentina that do not fit well in the main approaches to the nature 
of money. These two monetary circuits, provincial and community currencies, were introduced 
as units of account to denominate the value of debt and circulated as means of payment to 
overcome monetary stringency during the crisis of 1999-2003. After discussing several theories 
on the nature of money, we reflect on the institutional significance of currency circuits as 
concurrent and rather stable pairs of trade and money. We suggest that several theories of 
money need to be combined to account for the variety and heterogeneity of daily monetary 
practices in a broad spectrum of countries. 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Different flavours of monetary theory fare better at explaining money depending on the socio-
economic context and, especially, the scale of the economy it mediates. The Argentine case 
provides a great deal of empirical evidence against which different theoretical explanations of 
money can be tested. In 2002 Argentina had several monetary forms circulating at the same time 
at the national, sub-national and local community levels. Such richness is a consequence of the 
fact that monetary experimentation in Argentina took place over a period of several decades and  
at all scales from the global down to the neighbourhood level, in all cases involving millions of 
people. As the scale of economic systems decreases, the relative importance of the social 
dimension increases, such that the mix and relative importance of the disciplinary perspectives 
needed to understand the nature of money also changes. To understand the Argentine monetary 
experience of the last few decades and of the 1999-2003 period in particular a combination of 
theoretical perspectives is required, no single theory of money will do. This paper wishes to 
make a contribution in this regard by looking into the plurality of monetary forms in Argentina, 
which is barely covered in discussions on the nature of money.  
 
As explained by Ingham (2004) discussions on the nature of money are broadly divided 
between the Aristotelean commodity theory of money and the claim or credit theory. The 
commodity theory is still the main reference point in economics. It proposes that a commodity 
of intrinsic value emerged as preferred medium of exchange in barter-based markets and has 
been dominant in policy circles at least since Menger published On the Origin of Money (1892). 
The credit theory explains how markets and economic exchanges worked before money was 
invented; traders in small-scale societies used credit and kept track of who owed what to whom, 
rather than engaging in direct barter as Adam Smith claims (Graeber, 2011). In today’s post-
gold standard economies credit money is again created endogenously as loans by banks in 
response to a demand for means of payment to finance production (Gambetta, 1988; Rochon 
and Rossi, 2003; Realfonzo, 2006, Schumpeter, 2006 [1954]).  Similar to the credit theory but 
with a more sociological emphasis, the institutional theory (Bell, 2001; Wray, 1998; Ingham, 
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1996) sees money as a social relation of credit and debt ‘which exists independently of the 
production and exchange of commodities’ (Ingham, 2004, p. 12). This is in fact the mechanism 
through which money is created, whether by banks as loans or by the state as public debt. After 
it is spent a few times the fact that it was created as debt is forgotten, as is the original social 
relation between creditor and debtor, and the perception of money as a ‘thing’ (Dodd, 2014) 
remains dominant. The view of money as an institution differentiates the structures of various 
monetary forms and the contexts in which they emerge (Ingham, 1998; Ingham, 2004; Smithin, 
2000; Gilbert, 2005; Swanke, 2004). The third alternative to the commodity theory is Knapp’s 
state or ‘chartalist’ theory of money, from the Latin ‘charta’ for paper, according to which 
money is anything that the state will accept as payment for taxes (Knapp, 1973 [1924]; Wray, 
1998; Wray, 2004a; Goodhart, 1998). According to this theory, money must refer to an 
authority from which it derives its legitimacy. 
 
Our study seeks to discuss the possible combinations of these theories to understand the daily 
practices with money in Argentina between 1999 and 2013. Our empirical data was gathered 
across the country between 2001 and 2013 in a larger research project (Gomez, 2009; Gomez, 
2015). The availability of contemporary data constitutes a relative novelty in the discussion on 
the nature of money (Tymoigne and Wray, 2006) and facilitates a reflection on the structural 
conditions under which socio-economic systems nest money, which have been discussed by 
other authors (Swanke, 2004; Dodd, 2014; Cohen, 1999; Blanc and Desmedt, 2014). The 
primary data on community currencies was gathered by means of interviews, surveys, focus 
groups and ethnographic methods. Provincial currencies have been followed in academic and 
grey material and primary data was gathered through interviews with experts and officials. The 
article first describes the background of monetary experiences in Argentina, and then presents a 
bird’s eye view on theories of money. It continues with the analysis of Argentina’s currency 
circuits at provincial and community levels in Sections 4 and 5. It concludes with reflections on 
how monetary practices relate to the theoretical approaches on money. 
 
 
2. Argentina’s experimentation with money 
 
During the crisis around the Millennium, the capacities of the Argentine state were being 
challenged and a number of monetary forms were circulating in multiple, stable and interlinked 
‘monetary circuits’, a concept used loosely by Ingham (2004) and which is similar to that of 
‘currency circuit’ defined by Kuroda (2008, p. 21) as the steady ‘coupling of a particular money 
and a particular trade’ concurrent in time and space but without stable exchange rates. Each one 
of the Argentine monies fulfilled the functions of unit of account, medium of exchange, means 
of payment and reserve of value for thousands of users. However, as a general trend, they acted 
poorly as units of account and reserves of value, while they did work as means of exchange and 
payment to a more satisfactory extent. Each one derived from different forms of credit relations 
and reflected specific institutional arrangements of impersonal exchange related to national or 
sub-national state sovereignty and sometimes limited to communities and networks.  
 
In the mind of many Argentines, money is far from the untouchable state institution described in 
textbooks, and is closer to a flexible social construction that can be restructured at political will. 
The reasons for Argentina’s peculiar experience with money cannot be addressed in sufficient 
detail because of space limitations and to a significant extent they have been discussed 
elsewhere (Cortes Conde, 1989; Cortes Conde, 2005; Gerchunoff and Llach, 2005). Ingham 
(2004, p. 165-174) attributes Argentina’s monetary ‘fragmentation’ to a failure of the 
government to tax and to issue debt bonds nationally, but to various degrees these two 
phenomena are historically characteristic of all developing countries around the world 
(Herschel, 1978; Gordon and Li, 2009; Eichengreen and Hausmann, 2010). In contrast, the 
existence of extensive and concurrent monetary circuits at subnational and community levels in 
modern times is particular to Argentina. The main reason for this exception needs to be sought 
in the inflationary history of the country and the policies of successive governments. Yearly 
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inflation averaged 300% between 1975 and 1990, but mounted in cycles of accumulated budget 
and balance of payment deficits in hand with the political cycle; after elections were won, 
governments introduced stabilisation programmes to cure inflation and fiscal deficits (Kiguel, 
1991; Streb, 1998; Streb, 1996). Peronist redistributive and populist policies aggravated the 
depth of the cycles. Stabilisation programmes repeatedly included changes in Argentina’s unit 
of account with the elimination of digitsi. On each occasion in which the unit of account 
changed, economic agents would inevitably reflect on the nature of money.  
 
The government contributed to the construction of state money as a flexible institution in other 
ways and in 1962, for instance, paid public wages in small denomination bills of credit instead 
of regular money. The bonds were designed to function as reserve of value (they paid a low 
interest rate) but circulated widely as means of payment until they expired (Cortes Conde, 
2005). In the 1980s the Argentine central government did not prevent two small provinces 
(Tucumán and Jujuy) from paying their wages with provincial debt bills, which circulated 
locally along national means of payment (Schvarzer and Finkelstein, 2003).  
 
In turn, the US dollar became a second currency initially as unit of account to denominate high-
value goods and contracts but later on to settle payments for daily necessities such as groceries. 
The inflationary period between May 1989 and the end of 1990 became a hyperinflationary 
surge with an increase in the consumer price index of 200% a month (July 1989). In 1991 the 
government implemented a currency board that pegged the peso to the US dollar, so in practice 
the monetary base would be aligned with inflows of foreign currency. The convertibility regime 
cured inflation for almost a decade but caused severe recessions until the currency board 
collapsed and economic activity plummeted between 1999 and 2003. In 2001-2002, Argentina 
had five different and concurrent monetary circuits. Because of space limitations this study will 
discuss in detail the two most peculiar monetary forms, which are the sub-national (provincial) 
and community currencies. We will focus specifically on the introduction of these types of 
money, their acceptance and their institutionalisation in the medium term. 
 
 
3. Approaches to the origins and meanings of money 
 
In a central book of reference, The Nature of Money, Geoffrey Ingham (2004) draws on Keynes, 
Searle and Schumpeter, among others, and states on page 12 that ‘regardless of any form it may 
take, money is essentially a provisional “promise” to pay, whose “moneyness”, as an 
“institutional fact”, is assigned by a description conferred by an abstract money of account. 
Money is a social relation of credit and debt denominated in a money of account’. Ingham adds, 
however, that not all credit relations evolve into money, but only those that are first ‘constituted 
as transferable debt based on an abstract money of account’ (emphasis in original). In other 
words, where there is money, there is debt that can be cancelled with it and there is an abstract 
unit of account to quantify the debt. These statements are valid ‘within a given monetary space’, 
Ingham continues, that is the specific area where the claim of moneyness is enforceable, and 
refers to ‘networks of credit/debt relations that are underpinned and constituted by sovereignty’, 
referring to Aglietta and Orléan (1998).  
 
Ingham thus summarises the main key points. First, money is a unit of account, an aspect that 
Keynes (1930) underlined as its primary feature and enables the measurement of debts, 
contracts and prices across time and space. Second, money is at the same time debt and credit 
that are transferred from one actor to another; Innes (1914) explained that creating money is an 
accounting operation of a creditworthy agent, the convergence of an act of crediting the client’s 
account (thus creating a liability for the issuer) and crediting the issuer for the amount of the 
loan (thus creating an asset for the issuer). Third, money takes many forms because credit takes 
many forms and has various social and cultural implications. Fourth, money is an institution, a 
fact independent of any particular individual agent. Fifth, money is valid within specific 
monetary spaces defined by sovereignty, presumably a national state authority. 
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The last is a point of contention between the endogenous money approach and the chartalist 
approach and one on which the Argentine experience with five monetary circuits can cast light.  
Means of payment based on credit were accepted in trade long before there were official or 
central monetary systems and before nation-states used money as a symbol of sovereignty and 
collected taxes (Gilbert, 2005). Dodd (2014, p. 6) goes as far as stating that the ‘state is 
unessential in the ontology of money’ because money has existed when and where states did 
not. A single centralised money was unnecessary when the poor used barter and low 
denomination tokens, often privately issued and not easily convertible into the official money of 
the better-off (Gilbert and Helleiner, 1999; Wray, 1998). Graeber (2011, p. 211) offers a 
somewhat different account in which historical periods when physical money was dominant 
alternated with periods when credit as long-standing relations was dominant.  
 
The endogenous credit money theory emphasises credit/debt relations between non-state actors 
(Schumpeter, 2006 [1954]). Rochon and Vernengo, for instance, note that money is ‘a creature 
of banks rather than a creature of the state’ (2003, p. 61) and sustain that banks create money in 
response to the demand for credit from the general public, especially businesses that need to 
finance production. The circuitist version adds that money is created endogenously within the 
economic system and takes the ‘extrinsic value’ of the production it enables (Gnos and Rochon, 
2002; Wray, 1998). There is an influx when the credit in the form of money enters the circuit 
and an outflux when the debt is repaid to banks, and between those two moments credit-money 
generates a chain of transactions including the payment of wages and other goods and services 
in the circuit (Realfonzo, 2006; Graziani, 2003; Rochon and Rossi, 2003). The state is not 
absent; its roles are to define rules of creditworthiness that authorise banks to issue credit and to 
issue credit money to pay for its own expenses.  
 
Money is a key institution of capitalism (Ingham, 1996; Swanke, 2004; Papadopoulos, 2009). 
Hodgson (2006, p. 2) defines institutions as ‘systems of established and prevalent social rules 
that structure social interactions’. Institutions create reciprocal expectations which constitute an 
incentive for agents to reproduce them, although compliance is always imperfect. Institutions 
become ‘self-enforcing’ and Greif and Kingston (2011, p. 27) claim that ‘from each decision-
maker’s perspective, the others’ expected behaviour constitutes the structure motivating her to 
conform to the behaviour expected of her. But by conforming, she contributes to motivating 
others to conform too. Thus, the structure is self-perpetuating, and although it is beyond the 
control of each decision maker, it is endogenous to all of them taken together’. Swanke (2004, 
p. 85) makes a similar point and states that money operates as such because ‘people expect it to 
be money’, so if they expect a monetary form to be accepted in trade, then they will accept it as 
medium of exchange in trade. A final implication of money as an institution is that these evolve 
through history and Swanke (2004, p. 93) suggests that money became an institution ‘when 
people who were not involved in its origins were introduced to it and accepted it as a concrete 
reality’, which is consistent with the concept of reification in Berger and Luckmann (1966, p. 
106). Money is created by actors in credit/debt relations and other agents join the monetary 
circuit accepting it as such because money is an ‘institutional fact’ (Searle, 2005). As Hodgson 
expressed it, ‘institutions are simultaneously both objective structures “out there”, and 
subjective springs of human agency “in the human head”’. That money becomes an institutional 
fact is particularly relevant to the case of the Argentine monetary circuits. 
 
Argentina is far from a unique case in terms of monetary experimentation. Community, 
complementary, or alternative currencies tend to emerge in periods of depression or deep 
economic crisis. A recent example is the LETS mutual credit system (Croall, 1997), which was 
invented by Michael Linton on Vancouver Island during an economic crisis in the early 1980s. 
The largest and oldest contemporary example of mutual credit is the Swiss WIR 
(http://www.wir.ch/de), and Sardex in Sardinia (http://www.sardex.net/) is its most successful 
emulator to date. 
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4. Provincial currencies 
 
By the end of the 1990s, the Argentine economy was collapsing under the stringencies of the 
currency board. Within a climate of economic demise, in 2001 the government imposed 
limitations on the amount of cash that the public could withdraw from their bank accounts. The 
restrictions affected more severely the lower-income informal firms that sell their goods and 
services in cash; the shadow economy was estimated at a stable one fourth of GDP (Schneider, 
Buehn and Montenegro, 2010). The crisis depressed tax collection, which led to a budget deficit 
that could not be covered by issuing money because of the convertibility programme, so the 
central government pursued more tax increases and budget cuts despite the rise of the 
unemployment rate to 16.4% by May 2001.  
 
Considering the clientelistic nature of public employment and Peronist distributive politics at 
the provincial level (North, 2007), the Argentine provinces categorically refused to further 
reduce the expenses in their jurisdictions. The province of Buenos Aires was a typical example 
of Peronist clientelistic politics and was at the brink of default in 2001. It sought a loan from a 
consortium of national banks, which denied the credit but came up with an alternative plan. 
They would loan one third of the funds, while another third would come from budget cuts and 
the last third could be covered by a one-time issue of a two-year bill called Emergency 
Provincial Bond. The province accepted the proposal and issued promises to pay in the form of 
low denomination bills which were used to pay part of the wages of their public servants and 
political clients (Gomez and Wit, 2015; North, 2007).  
 
It was no novelty that Argentine provinces issued bills that circulated as currency in their own 
unit of account, despite the opposition of multilateral organisations like the IMF. Provincial 
governments had issued local currencies back in the eighties, when the bills also circulated as 
currencies within the provincial territories. Some provinces had never stopped using them, such 
as Tucumán, which Théret and Zanabria (2009) discuss as part of a phenomenon they term 
‘monetary federalism’. With squeezed budgets, in 2001 and 2002 a dozen other provinces 
decided to follow the example of Buenos Aires and also issued their own currencies to pay 
wages and outstanding debts with suppliers. These monetary forms were then referred to as 
‘quasi-currencies’ (Schvarzer and Finkelstein, 2003). In September 2001 the provincial 
currencies represented 5 per cent of the national monetary base; they later climbed to 25 per 
cent and 33 per cent in January 2002 and October 2002 respectively (Chelala, 2003), as the 
crisis aggravated and shrunk available public funds.  
 
In terms of monetary creation, the provincial currencies were born to cancel an existing debt 
that provincial governments had with their workers, the wages. Those debts were denominated 
in national money in the employment contracts, but when the provinces could not honour them, 
they monetised the debts in a newly created unit of account and paid them in their own 
currency, thereby launching a parallel monetary circuit within their territories. Workers and 
suppliers did not have the option to reject provincial bills, but the currencies subsequently 
circulated as means of payment among shops and businesses in the provincial territories, hence 
extending the use of the provincial unit of account. The acceptance of the bills was not linked to 
any backing of intrinsic value or to other currencies in a monetary hierarchy, as described by 
Bell (2001).  
 
Establishing a money of account at sub-national level seems in itself a political breakthrough. 
Chelala (2003) explains that the provincial bonds kept their value because of the depth of the 
economic decline (any money was better than no money at all), and because they could be used 
to pay provincial taxes and earned a 7% interest rate if kept as reserve value. A 7% interest rate 
was modest in comparison with the average 10% interest rate paid on 30-day bank deposits 
between 2001 and 2005 (World Bank Indicators, 2015). The second argument makes sense from 
a chartalist perspective because there was a pre-existing obligation of every inhabitant and 
business in the territory to pay provincial taxes, so the governors basically issued a debt bond 
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against that future obligation of their citizens to pay taxes. The concept of sovereignty is usually 
reserved for the national level, but the provinces stretched it to the sub-national level. The 
moneyness of the bills could be enforced on geographically bounded users in a country like 
Argentina, where governors can claim considerable local sovereignty (Théret and Zanabria, 
2009). It is consistent with Keynes’s conception of money as first and foremost a unit of 
account selected by a government and accepted as cancellation of taxes (Ingham, 2004; Wray, 
1998; Knapp, 1973 [1924]). Although in a loose way, provincial monies related to subnational 
sovereignty and endorsed the political nature of the contract ‘between the guarantor of the 
validity of money and its users’ (Ingham, 2004: 49).  
 
The state money approach, however, can only give a partial explanation of the acceptance of the 
provincial bonds because tax collection in Argentina is centralised by the national government. 
Provinces receive federal transfers and are allowed to levy taxes directly on real estate, stamps 
and permits, and a small percentage of the revenues made by businesses registered in their 
territories. The public acceptance of provincial bills within geographically limited monetary 
circuits went far beyond their taxes or the transfers from national tax revenues. The provincial 
monetary circuits worked as a chain of credits and debts that integrated provincial governments, 
public employees, and local businesses in a monetary circuit of ‘circulating debt’, using 
Schumpeter’s term (2006 [1954]). Innes suggested that governments integrate monetary circuits 
not because they are the issuers of fiat money but because they are ‘a great buyer of services and 
commodities’ that can redeem debts by taxation (Innes, 1914, p. 168). In the case of the 
Argentine provinces, governments were not only big buyers in terms of trade but also big 
debtors in terms of outstanding payments, and had a claim of sovereignty within their territories. 
The combination of both outstanding debt and sovereignty allowed them to define a unit of 
account and issue currencies whose moneyness was accepted within geographically bounded 
monetary spaces. 
 
The explanation would be incomplete if we did not consider that provincial currencies were also 
used by informal businesses that did not pay taxes and did not have outstanding credits or do 
business with the provincial governments. Informal enterprises became part of the provincial 
currency circuits, nevertheless, because any monetary form was better than none at all and they 
accepted the bills in exchange for their goods and services because others were accepting them 
as ‘an institutional fact’, at least for a while. In that sense, provincial currencies became an 
institution ‘out there’ and soon belonged to the ‘self-enforcing’ social knowledge of what can be 
considered money, using Greif and Kingston words (2011, p. 27). Swanke (2004) similarly 
described that the institution of money extends to those not directly implicated in the credit/debt 
relations that originate money.  
 
The experience with provincial currencies was mixed. In some provinces they had a reactivating 
effect on the local economy while, in others, the clientelistic use of provincial currencies was 
exaggerated and they depreciated fast. The quantities issued climbed to a large percentage of the 
provincial gross value of production and/or budgets (Schvarzer and Finkelstein, 2003) and they 
fuelled inflationary processes. Supermarkets, for example, accepted provincial currencies as 
payment for their sales because they could redeem them in payment for provincial taxes or pay 
their workers’ wages, but when the amount of bills increased beyond the supermarkets’ tax 
obligations and capacities to circulate them in their own credit/debt relations, they started 
rejecting them or took them at a fraction of their nominal value. The experience resonates with 
Innes’s (1914) indication of the limits to issuance in relation to the capacity of governments to 
redeem taxes in their own monetary form, but also in relation to the scale of production and 
exchange in a monetary circuit which give ‘extrinsic value’ to the currency.  
 
Provincial currencies originated as a unit of account to quantify credit/debt relations. There was 
no collateral in the form of commodities or reserves, or link to harder currencies; the provincial 
monies were imposed on the provincial creditors, who were workers and suppliers, and that 
imposition was possible because of a certain degree of sub-national sovereignty and future tax 
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debts. The currency was not only redeemed as tax payments but triggered a chain of circulating 
debt within the provincial territory that subsequently reached even the informal agents that 
neither paid taxes nor sold products to the government directly. The further circulation of the 
currency was related to the extrinsic value of a local economy where goods, services and labour 
were being supplied and demanded within provincial monetary circuits. Velocity of circulation 
supported trade well beyond the monetary mass issued, although no estimations were made, and 
provincial currencies protected the circulation of products which partially provided the backing 
to the currency in circulation.  
 
In conclusion, there was a significant untapped spare capacity of extrinsic value in the 
provincial economies that was only monetised in the additional local currency circuit. It was 
possible to create more money at the local level because there was local backing to spare that 
was not being used. The relative success of provincial monetary circuits suggests that 
explanations on the nature of money require a combination of theories to fully account for why 
users accept money, sustain its value, and subsequently expand the circuit in scale and scope of 
users. 
 
 
5. Community currencies: money without state backing 
 
Years before the provinces issued bills, Argentines had access to a family of community 
currencies launched in 1995. In 2002, during the peak of the crisis, these were used by about 
20% of the economically active population, according to some sources (Ovalles, 2002). The 
name given to the Argentine Complementary Currency Systems was Redes de Trueque or 
Exchange Networks, and they were one of several income-generation schemes launched in 
reaction to the neoliberal reforms of the nineties (Gomez, 2009; Pearson, 2003; Gonzalez 
Bombal, 2002). 
 
The first Trueque group was established with 30 neighbours in a former industrial suburb of 
Buenos Aires in 1995. It was a spin-off of the activities of two environmentalist NGOs which 
promoted growing fruits and vegetables in urban gardensii. At some point, the participants 
started exchanging excess vegetables to make jams, preserves and so on and then trading them 
with others. The initiators thought it would be a good idea to organise it more systematically 
and tried several schemes until a method became stable around May 1995. The participants 
would bring products every Saturday and the organisers set their prices in an imaginary unit of 
account. If the participant agreed with the prices, which happened almost always, the goods 
stayed on offer and the organisers recorded a credit for the participant equal to the value of the 
products denominated in the group’s unit of account. After the pricing process, the participants 
chose products up to the amount of their credit. The remaining balances were usually small and 
were transferred to subsequent meetings, and the same happened to left-over products. 
 
The original group used a fictional unit of account to price goods because it wanted to indicate 
that this was not a market but neighbours drawing goods from a common pool to which they 
had contributed. Prices were never at par with those in pesos but blended notions of gift and 
neighbouring with market exchange mechanisms. The organisers defined prices by relating the 
value, for instance, of a peach jam to the peaches harvested by someone in the group, the labour 
used, and ingredients bought in pesos. By creating a unit of account, the Trueque also created a 
separate price structure that bore a close relationship to the internal supply and demand of the 
products in the group. Kuroda (2008) discusses differentiated price structures per currency 
circuit in similar terms, showing separate relationships between prices in a unit of account and 
the supply and demand in each currency circuit. The unit of account was given the significant 
name of crédito to reflect interpersonal trust and existed only as ghost money on a paper 
notebook. It was an accountancy system of credits and debits of participants in relation to a 
collective pool of products. During fieldwork, the initiators and neighbours explained that using 
a commodity of small value as means of payment did not make sense because they could not 
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think of any commodity that would be absolutely widespread, meaningful, valuable, small and 
light-weight. ‘If it’s a basic necessity, then you eat it or use it, and if it’s not, what’s the value, 
why keep it?,’ participants reasoned. Besides, the neighbours wanted to see ‘numbers that could 
be easily compared to other numbers, and a commodity that can show information in that way 
that doesn’t exist’ (Interview with Initiator A, 14/6/2004). A unit of account allowed the 
participants to compare values to their own capacity to pay, as a precondition for trade. The 
experience substantiates empirically the implausibility that one unit of account would have 
resulted spontaneously in exchange and confirms Keynes’s (1930) reasoning that a unit of 
account depends on specific social agreements between creditors and debtors that cannot occur 
naturally among many agents. Moreover, accountancy money works better at these small scales 
because such a medium of exchange is not a commodity (its price is zero and its interest rate is 
zero). In the Trueque the functions of unit of account and medium of exchange are clearly 
stronger than that of store of value, although the latter still applies in the sense of storing 
purchasing power in the short term, which was all that such a market required.  
 
The initiators perfected the pricing system in the first months and hence defined the value of the 
unit of account. They also observed that the effects of the scheme were more significant than 
they had anticipated. The Trueque supported households’ economies and the exchange meetings 
of Saturdays were constantly expanding their scale, scope, duration and number of participants. 
The initiators felt that the impact of the scheme would strengthen if it grew beyond its 
uniqueness. They started searching for partners and succeeded in replicating the scheme when 
four more groups were settled across Buenos Aires in 1996. Each group used a single unit of 
account and a separate notebook for records, but they wanted to trade with each other, which 
meant pricing a single product in two different units of account and recording the transactions in 
two notebooks. When the total membership reached about 100, the accountancy of credits and 
debits became too burdensome, and one of the initiators suggested, ‘what if we print money? 
We can make notes in a print-shop,’ (Initiators’ group interview, 4/8/2004). Paper money was 
introduced by the end of 1996 using the crédito as single unit of account across all five 
exchange groups, although prices still differed after local conditions of supply and demandiii. 
Paper money was cheap to produce, facilitated payments and supported the expansion of the 
scheme, which mainly attracted participants who sought to protect a middle-class lifestyle with 
some extra income.  
 
The scheme became more structured and went from being a curious experiment to an invaluable 
income option for thousands of households. Participants entered the circuit paying a small 
contribution in pesos, which were used to pay for the printing of the paper money. They 
subsequently sold their goods and services for créditos, thereby holding a claim in créditos on 
the goods and services of others in the circuit, and created a chain of credit/debt relationships. 
The crédito was initially defined as ‘a social contract among peers’ (Interview with Initiator A, 
4/11/2006). It was neither convertible to the peso nor backed by capital in commodities or 
stronger currency, because nobody in the scheme had such capital, although it was informally 
backed by circulating products. The introduction of paper money also stretched the cognitive 
distance between the crédito as a currency and the trust required in interpersonal credit/debt 
relations. The organisers did not fully understand the negative impact of the expansion on trust 
and assumed that new participants would be reliable and committed to their non-capitalist 
market. They would soon be proved wrong and in 1997 they had to deal with forgery, which 
they dismissed as a one-off event.  
 
Concurrently with the expansion, new leaders emerged and promoted the idea that to sustain the 
acceptance of the currency within a ‘closed circuit’ it was enough to couple the issuance of 
money with an equivalent growth of trade in each currency circuit. The more diverse leadership 
established the rule of giving a loan of fifty créditos to each new participant to start trading 
against the promise that the participants would give the créditos back if they left the scheme. 
Each new member hence contracted a debt with the issuing group and generated a fixed influx 
of currency into the circuit. In technical terms, the scheme created money endogenously along a 
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horizontal supply curve (Wray, 2004b; Realfonzo, 2006). The value of the injected créditos was 
‘extrinsic’, in Wray’s terminology (1998), because the entrants increased the supply in the 
circuit by an equivalent amount in kind (goods and services of own production or second-hand 
stocks).  
 
By 2000, when the regular economy and the quantity of pesos were shrinking, the Trueque was 
booming. By 2002 there were hundreds of local exchange clubs with a total estimate of 2.5 
million households in 5,800 locations across the country (Ovalles, 2002), an unknown number 
of different créditos and thousands of groups working in different ways. Some groups used their 
own local unit of account while others were articulated with a common unit of account for 
several locations. The initiating network became the largest one and integrated hundreds of 
clubs across the country with one unit of account and a poor accountancy system.  
 
At the same time, the Trueque leadership was deeply divided in opposing groups that supported 
different visions on reinventing the economy, money and politics (North, 2007). While the 
initiators established a short-lasting collaboration with the government in 2001, many other 
participants and leaders in the Trueque did not want to relate to a state they saw as corrupt and 
unreliable. The state did not legally regulate the Trueque because it underestimated the 
importance of the scheme and had a myriad of challenges to its sovereignty besides the 
monopoly on the issuance of money. Eventually, Peronist political brokers would see the 
Trueque as a challenge to their informal powers and would undermine it at the grassroots level 
and through the mass media (North, 2007; Gomez and Wit, 2015). 
 
The Trueque started with households of the fallen middle class of Argentina but eventually 
integrated a larger public, promoted start-ups, creativeness and self-employment, as well as 
speculation, abuses and inequalities (Gomez, 2010; González Bombal and Luzzi, 2006). The 
clubs became full of second-hand goods in comparison with limited production and supply of 
basic necessities such as food, so it plummeted at the end of 2002 in the midst of widespread 
forgery, internal scandals and power struggles among the leaders (North, 2007). By 2006, there 
were about 120,000 participants left in 350 local exchange clubs (Gomez, 2009). 
 
What made the crédito acceptable for almost a decade by hundreds and then thousands of users? 
From a state theory of money approach, the phenomenon appears as a curiosity and shows the 
final relevance of a formal authority to sustain money, but the Trueque was too large and lasted 
for too long to simply dismiss it. We see it as one example of dozens of other monetary circuits 
around the world that exist in parallel to state money (Seyfang and Longhurst, 2013; Blanc, 
2012). In order to explain community currencies in Argentina we need to draw on theories in 
which state sovereignty is not central. The conception of a ‘closed circuit’ referred by the 
organisers of the Trueque is the key to understand the chain of credit/debt relations described in 
the circuit money theory by Schumpeter (2006 [1954]), Innes (1914, 1913) and others (Parguez 
and Seccareccia, 2000; Rochon and Rossi, 2003). These authors did not deny the important role 
of the state in creating money, but looked mainly at what Schumpeter called ‘circulating debt’ 
(2006 [1954]).  
 
Money supply in the Trueque was endogenous and designed with a structure of influx-outflux 
along a horizontal money supply curve. It resonates with the circuitist approach, although this 
theory applies to other agents (banks that give credit and firms that contract debt) to launch 
chains of transactions with suppliers and workers (Realfonzo, 2006; Graziani, 2003). In the case 
of the largest Trueque networks, organisers acted as bankers of the monetary circuit and 
households became indebted to them and the organisation in order to join the circuit of 
transactions. The fact that non-government and community-based organisations can create 
money is an unlikely interpretation on who can create money, but Innes (1914, p. 168) 
suggested that ‘money in one form or another is, in fact, issued by banks, merchants, etc.’ and 
hence specified that money has many forms and its issuers are similarly varied. At the same 
time, Innes (1914) underlined the requirement of establishing careful accounting frameworks as 
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those developed by banks, and which the initiators’ network of the Trueque, for instance, did 
not have. Credits given to each participant when joining were not always properly registered or 
compared with their contribution in production to the monetary circuit. This explains why the 
crédito did not last as money on a large scale. Other groups within the Trueque implemented 
participative management and more careful accountancy systems, but the distinction was not 
sufficiently understood by the general public or the mass media. 
 
The social and economic conditions were critical for the rapid institutionalisation of the crédito. 
Tymoigne and Wray (2006, pp. 3-4) suggest that the creation of a unit of account has 
institutional consequences because it becomes socially recognised and structures new economic 
practices of exchange. In Argentina, the use of a separate unit of account gave the signal from 
the beginning that the Trueque was a parallel monetary circuit with a life of its own, an 
institutional fact that could exist independently from the specific neighbours and organisers that 
originated it. It evolved into what Ingham characterises as ‘transferable debt’ (2004, p. 12) 
because the original credit/debt relation through which the crédito was created evolved into an 
impersonal abstract token for value and means of payment after it had been transferred 
repeatedly. During fieldwork we noticed that many participants could not explain how the 
system worked or how it started. It resonates with Swanke’s (2004) claim that once the 
institution of money is in place, the actors simply forget how it was created and adopt it in their 
use. The crédito similarly became a self-reinforcing institution in which every participant 
accepted it as money because other participants also accepted it as such. As it happens with 
other informal institutions, the extra-legal or informal self-reinforcement of the crédito was 
imperfect.   
 
We highlighted the institutional and circuitist aspects to explain the moneyness of the créditos, 
but Chartalism is not irrelevant to the analysis. While most Trueque participants did not know 
the details of how the créditos originated, many of them referred to an imagined authority 
regulating the system and some local organisers travelled considerable distances to get the 
currency of the initiators in Buenos Aires because those créditos appeared to them more 
creditworthy than others. The original créditos, however, were no more legitimate under the 
Argentine law than a photocopy, but participants and local organisers assumed that the initiators 
had ‘monetary authority’ to print them. When questioned why they did not print their own 
complementary currency notes in a local print-shop, these local organisers replied ‘how could I 
do that?’ and insisted that it was ‘forbidden by the authorities’. Moreover, other groups printed 
their own créditos locally and emphasised that these were a key tool for social transformation 
and local resilience (North, 2008). Both attitudes suggest that the causality of the link between 
authority and money works in both directions. Chartalism identifies authority as the main 
condition to create money, but the opposite assertion seems to stand as well and creating money 
generates monetary authority in the hands of the issuers. This power is normally captured by 
modern states because at some point in history the perception of monetary authority was 
allocated to the state. In other words, creating a unit of account and a currency circuit confers 
authority to the issuers, who further accumulate power. Ingham (1999, p. 80) mentions that 
money is a ‘transformative power’, and indeed issuing money reinforces the power of the agents 
that can persuade others to accept their debt in the form of money.  
 
Nevertheless, the Trueque leaders were unable to prevent the massive forgery of currency, 
which North (2007) attributes to the organised actions of Peronist local leaders and brokers. An 
organiser expressed that by 2002 the Trueque collapsed because it was ‘full of notes and empty 
of goods’. Skaggs (1997) reminds us that currency is the evidence of services having been 
rendered but an equivalent not received though it can be demanded at any time. When the 
Trueque became empty of goods and services that participants could demand for their créditos, 
trust broke down and the system collapsed in a matter of months. The circuit that gave extrinsic 
value to the créditos dried out, so the unit of account collapsed.  
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In order to explain community currency systems, we have combined institutional approaches 
and the endogenous credit theory of money. We identified a group of agents involved in the first 
credit/debt relations that originated the unit of account and used the currency as means of 
payment and medium of exchange. A second group of agents received currency and 
subsequently transferred it; for them it was an institutional fact, so it was unnecessary to reflect 
on its origin. It created mutual expectations of acceptance and its rules were self-enforcing, 
although with imperfect compliance and only for a certain time. 
 
 
6. Conclusions  
 
This paper discussed monetary circuits in Argentina that do not fit well in the main approaches 
to the nature of money, and which were too large in scale and duration to be dismissed. They 
were, in fact, large and complex cases of monetary plurality in which concurrent but stable 
currency circuits exist in a specific time and space. The reasons why monetary plurality was 
exceptional to Argentina relate to its monetary history of high inflation and the peculiar ways in 
which governments and economic agents experienced money as a social construction. 
Additional monetary circuits emerged and this research focused on two of them: provincial 
currencies issued by subnational governments that circulated within their territories and 
community currencies created by grassroots organisations for the voluntary use of social 
networks. The monetary forms were introduced as units of account to denominate the value of 
debt/credit relations and were accepted as means of payment and media of exchange, while the 
function of store of value was relatively limited. They never used commodities to trade and 
were not linked to reserves of intrinsic value. They partially relied on the extrinsic value of the 
monetary circuits they sustained. 
 
A discussion of the nature of money based on current empirical data is a relative novelty in the 
literature. While analysing the introduction, acceptance and circulation of the Argentine 
provincial and community currency circuits, we found that daily monetary practices are 
inevitably more complex and heterogeneous than the theories to approach them. Each theory 
addresses a specific aspect or set of features of the Argentine monetary circuits, so we combined 
different strands of theory to achieve explanations that would best accommodate the complexity 
of daily experiences with money. We approached money as circulating debt, following 
Schumpeter (2006 [1954]), Innes (1914) and others (Wray, 1998; Wray, 2004a; Ingham, 1996; 
Ingham, 2004). In turn, provincial and community currencies represent institutions because they 
have normative and structuring content that guide agents’ interactions and create reciprocal 
expectations. At the same time, the Argentine case required us to relax some of the assumptions 
and definitions of the state and endogenous money approaches, which led us to reflect on the 
possibilities and limits to combining theories on the nature of money.   
 
We referred to the state theory of money because provinces could claim sub-national 
sovereignty on their territories and the provincial currencies were accepted to redeem taxes. 
However, chartalist approaches strictly reserve the concept of sovereignty for the central state in 
a normative conception that links authority, territory and population. We have shown that sub-
national sovereignty enabled the issuing of money under ‘monetary federalism’, which relates to 
the capacity to redeem some sub-national taxes (Théret and Zanabria, 2009). The relationship 
between sovereignty and money appears as more diverse than strictly advanced by the chartalist 
approach, especially in contexts in which state authority is fragile or challenged. Issuing 
currency implies powers to make others accept a debt as means of payment and its subsequent 
transferability in a circuit of credit/debt relations. It confers authority to the issuer, although in 
the case of the community currencies it was an imagined and informal type of authority in the 
hands of community organisations. As a matter of fact, a large proportion of the states in 
developing countries could be described as fragile states (Besley and Persson, 2011), while the 
monopoly on issuing money is also being challenged in developed countries by groups of 
citizens that reclaim the rights to use alternative means of payment (Seyfang and Longhurst, 
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2013), often with local governments as partners (Blanc and Fare, 2013). In order to be relevant 
to a larger number of countries, the chartalist approach could broaden the concept of 
sovereignty and the situations in which authorities can effectively choose the unit of account in 
which they accept tax payments.  
 
The endogenous money approach refers mainly to banks as issuers of credit/debt that is 
transferred as money to support production. It is clear from the Argentine community currency 
circuits that not only banks can issue money but also issuers that meet a set of conditions, such 
as reputation and leadership, coupled with social cohesion among the first recipients of a 
currency or serious economic need in a crisis. Innes (1914) allowed for the possibility of 
multiple issuers and mentioned, for example, merchants, but cautioned that issuers should 
emulate banks in terms of rules such as keeping adequate accountancy and relating the amounts 
issued to the extrinsic value of the circuit. It was not the case in the largest Trueque network and 
that failure led to its demise. In comparison, Sardex maintains thorough records and full tax 
transparency (Sartori and Dini, 2016). 
 
From a policy perspective, concurrent monetary circuits may offer an interesting policy tool at 
local level to increase the flexibility of the monetary system and to adapt to the requirements of 
local economies or during periods of crisis. The claim of sub-national sovereignty increases the 
appeal of such circuits, but within boundaries of acceptance and circulation to a specific 
territory in which moneyness can be guaranteed. In Argentina some provincial currencies 
created a positive impact when the amounts issued kept a strict relationship to the provincial 
gross value of production and provincial budgets, while community currencies worked as long 
as there was a strict relationship to the number of participants and the production they added.  
 
From a theoretical perspective, we found that the main distinction among the approaches to the 
nature of money is related to conceiving money as a social construction or a device of the 
market. The commodity theory can explain money as a disembedded and neutral technical 
device without reference to social and political agreements. The theory of money as credit/debt 
relations relies on understanding the social and political construction that sustains money. We 
have shown that anti-metallist and credit theories of money can work together because these 
approaches vary in emphasis but share the ontological foundation that money is an institution 
that changes in time and varies in format together with the nature of credit/debt relations. As an 
institution, money is nested in the circuits from where it emerges and further binds agents in 
structured relations with normative and transformative implications.  
 
In recognition of this variety, Dodd (2014) provides a very broad array of possible definitions of 
money, and an in-depth discussion of many theoretical perspectives from sociology, 
anthropology, economics, cultural theory, and post-modern philosophy. Evans (2009) points to 
a fundamental sociological question regarding the ontology of money: does ‘money change 
values’, i.e. is it a ‘corrosive force’ in society – as Simmel, Marx and Polanyi thought – or do 
‘values change money’, i.e. do social constructivist processes endow money with social values 
that shape it to fit given social contexts – as Veblen, Bourdieu, and later Zelizer (1994) 
proposed? The evidence from Argentina suggests that both outcomes are possible, depending on 
the economic scale of the monetary experiments; on structural features such as accounting 
system, taxation, rate of interest, and inflation; and on the governance, transparency, and 
accountability framework adopted. Trust pervades all these dimensions. It is required to get 
things started, and must be protected or all is lost. 
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i Successive programmes wrote off a total of thirteen zeros in four changes of units of account between 1969 and 1991. 
The ‘Peso Moneda Nacional’ circulated between 1881 and 1969 and was replaced by the ‘Peso Ley’ at a rate of 100 ‘Peso 
Moneda Nacional’ = 1 ‘Peso Ley’. In 1983 the ‘Peso Ley’ was replaced by the ‘Peso Argentino’, which was worth 10,000 
‘Peso Ley’. In 1985 the ‘Peso Argentino’ was replaced by the ‘Austral’ at a rate of 1 ‘Austral’ = 1,000 ‘Pesos Argentinos’. 
In 1992 the ‘Austral’ was replaced by the ‘Peso Convertible’ at a rate of 1 ‘Peso Convertible’ = 10,000 ‘Australes’. Billetes 
Argentinos, F. 2008. Modelos de billetes de la Republica Argentina. Buenos Aires. 
ii The two NGOs were led by Horacio Covas, Carlos de Sanzo and Ruben Ravena 
iii The groups were separated by about 2 hours’ travelling time in different locations of the metropolitan area of Buenos 
Aires. 
